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ELECTRONIC TRACKING DEVICES:
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS
By THoMAs C. MARKS, JR.* AND ROBERT BATEY**
INTRODUCTION
The few words of the fourth amendment' may well have
been interpreted more than any other provision in the Consti-
tution. However, as Justice Frankfurter said in Chapman v.
United States, "The course of true law pertaining to searches
and seizures, as enunciated here, has not - to put it mildly -
run smooth."' 2 There have in fact been many ripples.
Wending its way among the ripples and assorted turbul-
ences, a smooth channel of general principles has'developed.
Before one who has a "constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy" 3 can be subjected to search or seizure,
the requirements of the fourth amendment must be satisfied.
Since the fourth amendment proscribes unreasonable searches
and seizures, the key question in every fourth amendment case
is, what is reasonable? Generally, "reasonable" means that
there exists probable cause to search and seize with the exist-
ence of probable cause having been decided beforehand by a
judicial officer.4
Outside this smooth channel of the general rule, the rip-
ples, eddies, and turbulences continue unabated. The different
standards of reasonableness applicable to different types of
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. B.S. 1960, Florida State
University; LL.B. 1963, Stetson University; Ph.D. 1971, University of Florida.
** Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. B.A. 1970, Yale
University; J.D. 1974, University of Virginia; LL.M. 1976, University of Illinois.
I The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.
2 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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arrests5 and to different types of searches' are examples of these
eccentricities. The emergence of the electronic tracking device, 7
or ETD,' as a fourth amendment problem may prove to be a
ripple or, indeed, white water. ETD's, referred to as "beepers"
or, occasionally, "transponders," are devices that aid in track-
ing9 or locating a vehicle or other movable object;'" in one
5 Although probable cause is a constant requirement for arrests, the need for an
arrest warrant varies with the site of the arrest. Usually no arrest warrant is required
for arrests outside of the home. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). The
necessity for an arrest warrant for an arrest in a private home has found the lower
federal courts and the Supreme Court itself in considerable disarray. Compare Cool-
idge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473-78 (1971) (dictum), with id. at 511-13 n.1
(White, J., concurring and dissenting). See also United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886
(6th Cir. 1974); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc);
Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970).
For seizures of persons that fall short of being arrests something less than probable
cause may be reasonable; how much less will depend on the circumstances. See Penn-
sylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1 Some searches are reasonable with probable cause without a warrant. E.g.,
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (vehicle search); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (vehicle
search). Such cases fall under the general rubric of "exigent circumstances."
Some searches are reasonable without either probable cause or a warrant. E.g.,
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (vehicle inventory); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search incident to arrest); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 118 (1973) (consent search).
Other kinds of searches are reasonable with a warrant but no true probable cause.
E.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978) (regulatory inspection); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (regulatory inspection).
7 A number of law review articles have dealt with this subject. See Dowling,
"Bumper Beepers" and the Fourth Admendment, 13 CRiM L. BuL. 266 (1977); Note,
Electronic Tracking Devices and Privacy: See No Evil, Hear No Evil, But Beware of
Trojan Horses, 9 LoYoLA L.J. (Chicago) 227 (1977); Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers,
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461 (1977); Comment, Fourth
Amendment Implications of Electronic Tracking Devices, 46 CINN. L. Rav. 243 (1977);
Comment, 29 VAND. L. Rav. 514 (1976); Comment, 22 VML. L. REV. 1067 (1977).
These devices are also referred to as "beepers," "electronic location devices,"
"location buzzers," "radio detection finders," "trackers," "homers," "bird dogs," or
simply "signalling devices." "Beeper," however, is the most common term. A model
designed specifically for attachment to a motor vehicle was referred to as a "bumper
beeper" in United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1976) and in United States v.
Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976).
1 "The receiving device receives the signal transmitted by the beeper through two
antenna which measure the strength and direction of the transmission and is able
thereby to ascertain the approximate location of the beeper." United States v. Berg-
doll, 412 F. Supp. 1323, 1326 n.1 (D. Del. 1976).
11 Beepers are most commonly attached to automobiles, but a number of cases
have dealt with transponders, which are attached to airplanes. Transponders are simi-
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court's words, they are "self-powered electronic signalling
device[s]."" Whether the installation and monitoring of these
devices should be controlled by the general rule of fourth
amendment law or by one or more of the exceptions to that rule
is the topic of this article.
1 2
I. A SURVEY OF SiGNIFIcANT REPORTED ETD CASES
Most of the reported cases do not analyze adequately the
constitutional problem presented by electronic tracking de-
vices. The reported cases fall into three major categories: (1)
those which find that the use of an ETD violates a constitution-
lar in principle to "beepers," except they emit a distinctive radar signal which appears
on a radar screen as a "blip" distinctly different from ordinary radar "blips." See
United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cheshire, 569
F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Pretzinger, 542
F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976); People v. Smith, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1977); United
States v. One 1967 Cessna Aircraft, 454 F. Supp. 1352(C.D. Cal. 1978).
Since transponders are, for the purposes of fourth amendment analysis, indistin-
guishable from ordinary beepers, no distinction between them and ordinary beepers is
made in text discussion.
" United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 108 (1st Cir. 1977), vacating United
States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1979). See also United States v.
Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 861 (1975), aff'd in part and modified in part en banc, 537 F.2d
227 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam): Electronic tracking devices "emit periodic signals
which can be picked up on radio frequency. These signals establish the approximate
location of the object to which the beacon is attached by providing a line of position,
to the left or to the right, between the transmitter and the intercepting equipment."
12 This subject is one which many courts have attempted to evade, due to the
confused state of the law in this area. The Fifth Circuit expressed its relief at being
able to evade the puzzle this way: "We need not at this time solve the riddle of whether
an electronic 'bug' [of the beeper type] constituted a search within the strictures of
the Fourth Amendment, for this issue was not presented on appeal." United States v.
Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 862-63 (5th Cir. 1976). There are many other examples. United
States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1046 (1977), is
typical. After noting that the legality of beeper use is a "difficult question," the court
sidestepped it, noting that the beeper use under the peculiar facts of the case was
justified by "probable cause and exigent circumstances." See also United States v.
Washington, 586 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978) (the court reserved ruling on the fourth
amendment status of ETD use after noting that the question was "not settled." Id. at
1154).
Other courts have evaded the issue by finding that a valid consent to implant
the beeper was obtained. See, e.g., United States v. Kurch, 552 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.
1977). Another method of avoiding the issue is to find that the evidence in question is
not the "fruit" of the beeper use, so the legality of the beeper need not even be
considered. See, e.g., United States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1323 (D. Del. 1976); Fotianos v. State, 329
So.2d 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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ally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (2) those
which hold that maintaining surveillance over an individual by
means of an ETD intrudes upon no reasonable expectation of
privacy; and (3) those which assume that a constitutionally
protected expectation of privacy is involved, but which con-
sider that expectation satisfied by some event prior to the use
of the ETD, such as consent by a third party.
A. ETD Use Implicates the Fourth Amendment
United States v. Holmes is the leading case to hold that
ETD use should be categorized as a search implicating fourth
amendment protections.1 3 With no actual physical entry, an
ETD was magnetically attached to the underside of Holmes'
van. Monitoring the ETD led to the discovery of a large amount
of marijuana and the arrest of nine persons, including Holmes.
The trial court held that "the use of the beeper to monitor
the movements of the van was a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment, and that the search was illegal because of the
failure to obtain a warrant for its installation."' 4 In what is
arguably dictum, the trial judge also found "that an applica-
tion for a warrant would have been rejected because no proba-
ble cause existed to justify its installation."' 5
. A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed each of
the rulings of the district court, citing Katz v. United States
and its reasonable expectation of privacy interpretation.'6 On
,2 United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (1975), aff'd in part and modified in part
en banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Comment, 29 VAN. L. Rav. 514
(1976).
,1 521 F.2d at 863.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 864, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The panel's opinion
stated:
A person has a right to expect that when he drives his car into the street,
the police will not attach an electronic surveillance device to his car in order
to track him. Although he can aiticipate visual surveillance, he can reasona-
bly expect to be "alone" in his car when he enters it and drives away.
521 F.2d at 866. The panel pointed out that only one other case had addressed the ETD
problem and that case had supported the rulings of the district court. Id. at 864 n.8,
citing United States v. Martyniuk, 395 F. Supp. 42 (D. Ore. 1975). Martyniuk was later
reversed in part by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Hufford,
539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). Hufford is now the leading
case contrary to Holmes on the question of the monitoring of an ETD as a fourth
[Vol. 67
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rehearing, the Fifth Circuit, en banc, agreed with the panel
opinion." The dissenters from the en banc decision, accepting
that the installation of the ETD and its use could possibly be
searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment, argued
that the facts which led the agents to use the beeper were
sufficient to meet the fourth amendment's requirement of rea-
sonableness and that, given the "exigent circumstance" and
"the minimal intrusion," no warrant should have been re-
quired."8
The lines of reasoning of the district court, of the court of
appeals, both in panel and en banc, and of the dissenting opin-
ion all share the same flaw. Nowhere is a clear distinction made
between the installation and the subsequent monitoring of the
ETD.19
The First Circuit, in United States v. Moore,20 did dis-
tinguish between installation and use, but not adequately. In
United States v. Moore, government agents placed one ETD
into a chemical container and one on a truck. The court em-
phasized that the two ETD's were used for two different pur-
poses: (1) to follow vehicles (both ETD's) and (2) to know if the
chemicals were still at the house (the ETD in the container
only) .
21
The-use of the two ETD's to assist in following the vehicles
was held to require probable cause.22 The court found ample
probable cause for the government agents to believe that the
defendants were engaged in the manufacture of a controlled
substance.m The court, however, required no warrant, appar-
amendment problem.
Holmes discussed standing at length. 521 F.2d at 861-70. It is the only reported
case to do so. Consequently, these holdings and the principle derived from them -
that standing should be granted to anyone whose proximity to the ETD brought him
under surveillance - could become quite significant if the Supreme Court ultimately
holds the fourth amendment applicable to ETD's. But cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S.Ct.
421 (1978).
17 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
' Id. at 229 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
" This distinction is discussed in text accompanying notes 54-57 infra.
21 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), vacating United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp.
1334 (D. Mass. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1977).
21 562 F.2d at 108-09.
2 Id. at 113.
nId.
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ently because of the "automobile" exception 4 to the warrant
requirement. 25 However, the placement of the ETD in the
house was another matter. Simply stated, absent an exception
to the warrant requirement, a warrant authorizing the monitor-
ing of the ETD in the house was required.
2
1
The Moore court 27 distinguished installation from monitor-
ing in two instances. First, "affixing the beepers to the under-
body of the vehicles was, standing alone, so minimal as to be
of little consequence." ' Similarly, the ETD was placed in the
chemical container "before title to the chemicals passed to
defendants." However, such a non-intrusive installation could
not legitimate the later monitoring of that ETD . 2 The court
did not explicitly distinguish installation from monitoring;
however, it did place the emphasis where it belonged by requir-
ing probable cause and a warrant for monitoring the ETD in
the container of chemicals once it had found its way into the
house. 0
B. No Implication of the Fourth Amendment in ETD
Monitoring
United States v. Hufford31 is the leading case to hold that
ETD monitoring does not violate the fourth amendment.3 2 Fed-
"' See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925).
" 562 F.2d at 112-13.
26 Id. at 113.
Two other courts have also concluded that use of an ETD triggers fourth amend-
ment protection. United States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Tex. 1978); People
v. Smith, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1977). See also United States v. Rowland, 448
F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Tex. 1977). Two more courts have assumed fourth amendment
applicability but found the ETD use constitutionally reasonable in the circumstances.
United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Frazier, 538
F.2d 1332 (8th Cir. 1976).
562 F.2d at 111.
n Id.
30 Moore was distinguished by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Clayborne,
584 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1978). That court saw a distinction between a beeper at rest in
a suspect's home, "which the Fourth Amendment protects from invasion," and one in
a laboratory rented by the suspect. Id. at 351. The perceived distinction is arguably
more apparent than real.
31 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
11 Other cases holding ETD monitoring does not violate the fourth amendment are
United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Miroyan,
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eral drug agents planted one beeper in a drum of caffeine and
attached another, pursuant to a court order, to the suspects'
truck battery. These beepers helped the agents locate a house
where illegal drugs were seized.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, ruling on the admis-
siblity of the evidence, stated: "We see no distinction between
visual surveillance and the use of an electronic beeper to aid
the agents in following the movements of an automobile along
public roads provided no Fourth Amendment violation oc-
curred when the beeper was attached. ' '33 The ETD was analog-
ized to other tracking devices that augment human senses,
such as binoculars, tracking dogs, or search lights. 34 The court
also referred to the cases involving informers who are wired for
sound. 5
The court reasoned that no infringement of any fourth
amendment right occurred in the placement of the first ETD
since the defendant had no constitutionally protected expecta-
tion that the chemical company would not consent to the in-
stallation of an ETD. In discussing the installation of the sec-
ond ETD with a court order (presumably a search warrant
issued on the basis of evidence produced by the first ETD), the
court emphasized the fact that prior judicial approval was ob-
tained. This discussion implied that a warrant supported by
probable cause would be required any time entry was necessary
in order to place an ETD, unless exigent circumstances excused
the obtaining of a warrant.
The Hufford court correctly saw the key distinction be-
tween the installation of the ETD and its monitoring, unlike
many of the other courts which have considered beeper cases.
However, its analysis is far from satisfactory for two reasons.
First, it found that since there is no constitutionally reasonable
expectation that a person will not be subject to surveillance
577 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1978); Curtis v. United States, 562 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 279 (1978); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.
1976) (per curiam); United States v. One 1967 Cessna Aircraft, 454 F. Supp. 1352 (C.D.
Cal. 1978).
539 F.2d at 34.
Id.
' Id., citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). See text accompanying
notes 44-46 infra for an analysis of this analogy. See generally Note, Police Use of Sense
Enhancing Devices and the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1977 ILL. L.F. 1167.
1978-79]
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when on a public road or in public airspace, the mere enhance-
ment of such surveillance by the monitoring of an ETD forms
no reasonable basis for changing that expectation."
Second, the Ninth Circuit found a constitutionally pro-
tected reasonable expectation that the installation of an ETD
would not be accomplished by improper government entry;
3 7
presumably, the court would hold that an improper installation
would require the exclusion of evidence obtained by later con-
stitutional monitoring. This analysis focuses on the wrong
thing: assuming that no constitutional expectation exists that
one is not being followed by the monitoring of an ETD, why
should it make a difference if the ETD was installed in an
illegal manner?"
C. Fourth Amendment Satisfied by Antecedent Justification
for the ETD's Use
Many cases have avoided following Holmes, Moore, and
Hufford, by using a variety of techniques which purport to
make a decision on the fourth amendment issue unnecessary.
39
However, most of these techniques do not avoid decision; they
merely obscure it.
In a number of cases, a direct decision on the constitution-
ality of ETD use has been avoided by a finding that third party
consent to the installation of the ETD eliminated the need for
a warrant or prior court approval." In Houlihan v. State,41 the
31 Perhaps the Ninth Circuit would find that there was a reasonable expectation
that a person will not be subjected to surveillance by the monitoring of an ETD when
not on a public road or in public air space - i.e., when he is at home. The questionable
soundness of this holding is discussed in text accompanying notes 58-75 infra.
17 539 F.2d at 34.
3 See text accompanying notes 86-93 infra for a discussion of the issues raised by
this question.
1, One technique which is valid involves application of the independent source
exception to the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. In a Florida case, Fotianos v.
State, 329 So.2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), the investigating officers planted a
beeper during a marijuana investigation. However, since they had also maintained an
independent visual surveillance of the vehicle in question, the court held that the
evidence obtained by tailing the vehicle Tvas admissible under the independent source
doctrine. The legality of the ETD use was not discussed.
I* See United States v. Cheshire, 569 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Abel, 548 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1977).
11 551 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. 1977).
[Vol. 67
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Texas Supreme Court held consent to be valid when the Hous-
ton police department loaned a beeper-equipped van to a per-
son suspected of dealing in drugs.2 Since the police could con-
sent to a search of their own van, the beeper use was held to
be proper.
3
In analyzing these consent cases, it is tempting to analo-
gize to the wired-informer case, United States v. White." There
a plurality held that monitoring a bugging device knowingly
worn by one participant in a conversation did not violate any
reasonable expectation of privacy held by another participant;
the unbugged conversationalist assumed the risk that the other
was wired for sound. By analogy, in accepting an item from
another person, one arguably assumes the risk that the pre-
vious holder has planted an ETD in the item. However, White
is distinguishable because it predicates the lack of any reasona-
bleness on the face-to-face nature of the conversation. White
had no reasonable expectation that the person to whom he was
talking would not inform the police; therefore, he could not
reasonably expect that person not to be wired for sound. The
one spoken to is the conduit for the electronic surveillance.
This is not the case with ETD monitoring; after the ETD's
installation, the one consenting to its use normally departs.
Without the ETD the consenter could never indicate where the
defendant took the monitored item . 5 Once the person consent-
ing to the ETD's use loses contact with the item in which the
device has been installed, the analogy to White fails."
42 Id. at 722.
Two cases arising in California have reached a conclusion contrary to that of
Abel, Cheshire, and Houlihan. See United States v. One 1967 Cessna Aircraft, 454
F. Supp. 1352 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (consent by prior owner of aircraft insufficient with
respect to purchaser); People v. Smith, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1977) (consent
by lessor of aircraft insufficient with respect to lessee).
4 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
" United States v. Kurck, 552 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1977), illustrates the only
situation in which analogy to White might be appropriate. In Kurck, government
agents attached an ETD to an informant's car and monitored it while both the inform-
ant and the defendant were in it. Since defendant Kurck assumed the risk that the
informant would indicate Kurck's whereabouts, it would be possible to argue that the
defendant also assumed the risk that the informant would use electronic devices to
keep himself and his companion under surveillance. But see note 46 infra.
11 Considering Justice Harlan's eloquent dissent in White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1971)




Another group of cases has involved the installation of an
ETD in contraband or its functional equivalent. 7 In United
States v. Emery,"s federal agents lawfully intercepted two
items of international mail containing cocaine. After installing
an ETD in each package, the agents allowed the packages to
reach their addressee. In response to an objection to the use of
the ETD's, the First Circuit held that there can be no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in contraband." Consequently, "the
government did not violate appellant's constitutionally pro-
tected freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. ' ' 0
This analysis is faulty because the emphasis is placed on
the installation. While there may not be a constitutionally pro-
tected reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband, that is
not the same as saying that one has no constitutionally pro-
tected reasonable expectation that his movements will not be
tracked by an ETD. The courts' analysis stops with the instal-
lation, which is the vice of many of the ETD cases.
Katz v. United States" provides the key to a proper analy-
sis. While Katz may have had no reasonable expectation that
he could not have been seen in the phone booth, he did have a
reasonable expectation against being overheard. Even if there
exists no reasonable expectation as to contraband, its posses-
sion should not destroy other reasonable expectations. 52 Some
11 One court labeled this a "trojan horse" technique. United States v. Perez, 526
F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir. 1976) (ETD planted in television given to suspect).
"1 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976), aff'g United States v. Carpenter, 403 F. Supp. 361
(D. Mass. 1975). United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1976), was a similar
case in which beeper use was upheld. There, a beeper was concealed inside a television
set which undercover government agents bartered for heroin. The heroin salesmen were
then tracked with the assistance of the beeper. See also United States v. Washington,
586 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978) (ETD planted in package of cocaine being mailed from
Panama to Miami); United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1978).
11 541 F.2d at 889-90. The First Circuit has limited the scope of its decision in
Emery. In United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), see text accompanying
notes 20-30 supra, that court refused to extend Emery to the installation of an ETD
in a package of chemicals, the possession of which was legal but which were useful
principally in the fabrication of a controlled substance. Judge Campbell asserted a
distinction between "items . . .whose possession is illegal and, . . goods, whatever
their suspected use, whose possession is legal." Id. at 111. In terms of reasonable
expectations of privacy, the distinction appears forced. See text accompanying notes
58-73 infra.
0 541 F.2d at 890.
s, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
5, Cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (guest has privacy interest in
[Vol. 67
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courts have relied on the sophistic argument that the police
officers did not use the ETD to track the suspect, only to track
the items the suspect had in his possession.53 If this reasoning
is an exception to a rule that there is a constitutionally pro-
tected expectation that one will not be followed by the monitor-
ing of an ETD, then the exception virtually eats up the rule,
for an ETD is nearly always attached to an item other than the
suspect.
II. ETD USE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Distinguishing Installation from Monitoring
The published opinions of courts that have considered
ETD's have not given the issue of monitoring adequate analy-
sis. Holmes and Moore do not focus adequately on monitoring
as compared with installation. Hufford does differentiate be-
tween the installation of the ETD and its monitoring but goes
on to hold that, for fourth amendment purposes, the installa-
tion is more significant than the monitoring. The consent and
contraband cases similarly focus on installation without clearly
distinguishing it from monitoring.
The only cases which highlight this critical distinction are
United States v. French54 and United States v. Tussell 5  The
approach in both cases is best summarized by the court in
French: "It would appear that the more judicially cognizable
event . . . is the monitoring of the [ETD] rather than its
installation, for only then is information yielded which perhaps
makes it a search. 56 To analyze properly a fourth amendment
objection to ETD use, a court should first differentiate the
ETD's installation from its monitoring; then attention should
turn to the constitutional significance of the monitoring.57
apartment where contraband is found).
'3 See, e.g., United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
11 414 F. Supp 800 (W.D. Okla. 1976). The federal agents in French put ETD's in
sacks of marijuana intercepted at the border and then tracked their movement from
Louisiana to Colorado. Id. at 801-02.
" 441 F. Supp. 1092 (M.D. Pa. 1977). Tussell involves an ETD installed in a DC-
6 with the consent of the airplane's lessee and then monitored as the plane flew from
the Bahamas to Pennsylvania. Id. at 1098-100.
414 F. Supp. at 803.
5 Having made the crucial distinctibn, the courts in French and Tussell proceeded
to measure incorrectly the fourth amendment implications of the monitoring in those
1978-79]
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B. Monitoring is a Search Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment
An analysis of the constitutional ramifications of ETD
monitoring must start with the question: Did what was done
interfere with any reasonable expectations of the type safe-
guarded by the fourth amendment?58
In Katz v. United States,59 the United States Supreme
Court held that monitoring a bugging device is a search or
seizure for fourth amendment purposes. 0 Katz has since come
to stand for the proposition that governmental intrusion on a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy makes the require-
ments of the fourth amendment applicable to the intrusion.'
Does a person involved have a reasonable expectation that he
will not be followed, or an object in his possession located, by
the monitoring of an ETD?
In Hufford, the Ninth Circuit held that monitoring an
ETD intrudes upon no reasonable expectation of privacy be-
cause "the device only augments that which can be done by
visual surveillance alone. . . .The [ETD] was merely a more
reliable means of ascertaining where [the suspect] was going
as he drove along the public road. '62 The simplicity of this
cases. The court in French asserts that the ETD's in that case were only used to keep
track of the items in which they were placed (sacks of marijuana) and not to monitor
the travel of the person moving those items, id. at 803-04, a highly artificial distinction.
While not as artificial as the rationale in French, the reasoning adopted in Tussell
does not squarely confront the problem of monitoring. The court in Tussell found that
monitoring the ETD in that case violated no reasonable expectation of privacy because
the government requires ETD's in all aircraft as large as the DC-6 tracked in Tussell.
441 F. Supp. at 1105-06. While this may be an appropriate resolution for Tussell, see
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (voluntary involvement in highly regu-
lated activity diminishes expectations of privacy), the decision does not solve any of
the problems posed by ETD monitoring in other situations. See text accompanying
notes 58-73 infra.
Compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), with Rakas v. Illinois, 99
S. Ct. 421 (1978).
11 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6 Id. at 353.
1 See id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). The actual language,
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy," is from Justice Har-
lan's concurring opinion, although it undoubtedly expresses what the majority opinion
intended to say. But see Note, Tracking Katz, supra note 7, at 1482 (reading Katz to
protect any reliance on "means . . . employed to preserve . . . privacy [which] are
calculated to be effective against reasonably curious members of the public at large").
62 539 F.2d 32, 34-35 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1977). See text
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analysis is deceptive. Surely the Supreme Court could have
followed that same simple reasoning in Katz: nonelectronic
eavesdropping does not raise fourth amendment questions,
since one's speech is knowingly exposed to all those within
earshot; bugging is just a more reliable means of eavesdrop-
ping; therefore, bugging does not raise fourth amendment ques-
tions either.6 3 But the Katz Court did not follow such a line of
reasoning. The shift from aural to electronic eavesdropping -
the dramatic leap in efficiency achieved through new technol-
ogy - made a difference to the Supreme Court. Should it also
make a difference in the context of ETD's?
Two courts of appeals have answered this question affirm-
atively, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Holmes4 and the
First Circuit in United States v. Moore.5 Holmes, the earlier
decision, took a less temperate view of ETD monitoring than
Moore. Holmes found "[n]o rational basis . . . for distin-
guishing" ETD installation from the installation of a bugging
device." Moore, on the other hand, concluded that while the
"intrusion" of ETD monitoring is "lessened" by the fact that
the monitored movement occurs in public, "still the intrusion
cannot be written off as nonexistent.
'67
The superiority of electronic surveillance over visual sur-
veillance suggests the merit of the balanced approach taken in
Moore. The leap in efficiency from visual to electronic surveil-
lance is not as staggering as the leap from aural to electronic
eavesdropping, but it is an impressive leap nonetheless. The
improvement of surveillance provided by electronic technology
renders this intrusion more than "abstract and theoretical""
and justifies application of fourth amendment limitations to
this form of surveillance.
accompanying notes 31-38 supra.
13 A similar argument appeared in Justice Black's dissent in Katz. 389 U.S. at 366-
67 (Black, J., dissenting).
- 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and modified in part en banc, 537 F.2d
237 (5th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 13-19 supra.
,5 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 20-30 supra.
521 F.2d at 865.
562 F.2d at 112.
'4 United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1332, 1336 (8th Cir. 1976) (Ross, J., concur-
ring).
" But cf. Smith v. Maryland, 47 U.S.L.W. 4779 (1979).
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The most difficult test for this principle should arise in the
monitoring of a vehicular ETD, since the weakest case from the
perspective of reasonable expectations is that concerning an
automobile." But, while there is no doubt that there is a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in an automobile, "[t]he word
'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears. ' 71 Even in Cardwell
v. Lewis, the examination of a tire and the taking of paint
scrapings were activities that required probable cause.72 Since
no probable cause is required to observe an automobile,
Cardwell appears to be almost exactly analogous to the ETD
situation. There can be no reasonable expectations that law
enforcement officials will not follow or locate a person by the
use of sight - perhaps aided with field glasses or tracking
dogs73 - as there was no reasonable expectation against observ-
ing the automobile in Cardwell v. Lewis. However, a reasonable
expectation does not exist with respect to the physical limita-
tions inherent in these means of surveillance: just as probable
cause was necessary for the more intensive search (paint scrap-
ings) in Cardwell, probable cause should be necessary to over-
come the existing physical limitations in monitoring a person's
movements. If there is a reasonable expectation against paint
scrapings, how much more reasonable is the expectation
against the monitoring of an ETD?
C. Making Monitoring Reasonable Under the Fourth
Amendment
Before monitoring an ETD, what must law enforcement
officials do in order to satisfy the requirements of the fourth
amendment? One federal judge74 has suggested that the police
must meet the high standards set by the Supreme Court 5 and
by Congress 76 for electronic eavesdropping. These standards
See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
7, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
72 417 U.S. at 591-92.
See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976) (police dogs);
United States v. Joyner, 492 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (tracking dogs); United States
v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1970) (binoculars).
7, United States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
78 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
t' 1'itle Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
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would require a warrant in virtually every case of ETD moni-
toring and would place strict limits on the duration of the
monitoring.77
Another federal judge has argued that ETD monitoring
should require no more than a showing of "reasonable cause,"78
a standard less demanding than probable cause, developed to
deal with limited intrusions such as entering a car to determine
its vehicle inspection number. Such a standard would permit
virtually unlimited electronic surveillance on a very flimsy
basis, with no provisions for prior judicial review.80
A balanced application of the fourth amendment would
allow ETD monitoring either if there is a valid warrant or if one
of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. The most
relevant exception in ETD cases is likely to be the
"automobile" exception." When an ETD is installed in a vehi-
cle or in an item to be carried in a vehicle, the police should
not need to obtain a warrant to monitor the ETD if the mobil-
ity of the vehicle does not allow sufficient time to obtain a
warrant and the police have sufficient probable cause to believe
that the vehicle or the item in it is being used in ongoing crimi-
nal activity. Thus in United States v. Moore, the court upheld
the warrantless monitoring of an ETD attached to the defen-
dant's van because "the agents had probable cause to believe
that a controlled substance was about to be made illegally.
8 2
§§ 2510-20 (1976).
n For example, in United States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Tex. 1978),
federal agents placed an ETD in defendant's airplane on August 31, pursuant to a
warrant. Later that day, the ETD signal was lost, and the agents did not pick the signal
up again until October 7. The plane was located that day, and its pilot arrest.6d for
various drug offenses. Id. at 148. Despite the fact that the agents "acted expeditiously"
once the signal reappeared, the court found the monitoring of the ETD constitutionally
infirm since the warrant placed no termination date on that monitoring. Id. at 150.
11 United States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227, 228 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
7, See, e.g., United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1971).
The three-judge panel in Holmes rejected this argument: "[Tihe opening of a
door to inspect the (vehicle inspection number] . . . is limited in time, scope, and
duration, unlike that involved when [an ETD] is used. In the instant case, the
[ETD] was in operation for over 42 hours." 521 F.2d at 866 n.14.
11 See note 24 supra and accompanying text. Another possibly relevant exception
to the warrant requirement is hot pursuit. See United States v. Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156
(5th Cir. 1976).
12 562 F.2d at 113. Contra United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (1975), aff'd in
part and modified in part en banc, 537 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1976). After holding the
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Although the warrantless monitoring of vehicular ETD's
may frequently be constitutional, the monitoring of nonvehicu-
lar ETD's will usually require a warrant. This conclusion raises
a set of unresolved questions: What showing will be necessary
to obtain a warrant? What restrictions should the warrant
place on the monitoring of the ETD? And what notice require-
ments should the warrant enact?
The probable cause standard applied in Moore - probable
cause to believe the monitored item is being used in ongoing
criminal activity - seems to be the best standard for determin-
ing whether a warrant should issue. The traditional concepts
of stalenessl should provide all the durational limits necessary
in executing warrants to monitor ETD's.'" Finally, the post-
execution notice procedures which have been approved for elec-
tronic eavesdropping 5 should translate easily into the ETD
context.
D. Defects In Installation
In most cases, the intrusion upon privacy posed by ETD
installation will be so minimal that any constitutional defect
in installing the device should be deemed to be cured by consti-
tutionally acceptable monitoring. Attributing fourth amend-
ment significance to installation independent of monitoring
was responsible for much-criticized judicial absurdities like the
distinction between Goldman and Silverman,8 and finally for
the Court's abandonment of the protected area concept in Katz
fourth amendment applicable to the monitoring of an ETD placed on Holmes' van,
the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that exigent circumstances could justify the war-
rantless action. "[Flailure to obtain a warrant is fatal." Id. at 867.
Compare People v. Wright, 116 N.W.2d 786 (Mich. 1962), with People v. Dolgin,
114 N.E.2d 389 (Il. 1953).
1, The issue of the length of time a warrant authorizing beeper use is valid has
not yet been settled. Compare United States v. Rowland, 448 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Tex.
1977) with United States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Tex. 1978). In both cases,
the courts agreed that a ten-day limitation on the face of the warrant meant that an
ETD had to be installed during that time, but they disagreed as to the necessity to
renew the warrant after it had been installed.
" See United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3rd Cir. 1973).
" Compare Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 219 (1942) (placing electronic
eavesdropping device against a party wall not a search or seizure) with Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (inserting electronic eavesdropping device into a
party wall is a search or seizure).
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v. United States: "[T]he reach of [the Fourth] Amendment
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intru-
sion into any given enclosure.
'87
Questioning the constitutionality of an ETD installation
focuses too much attention on areas,"8 and not enough attention
on persons and their expectations of privacy. For example, a
few ETD cases distinguish between external and internal
placement of a vehicular beeper, finding that installation in the
former case is not a search or seizure but that it is in the latter
case.89 No overwhelming significance should be attached to
such a distinction.
No important consequences should flow from the fact that
law enforcement officers armed with a valid warrant to monitor
an ETD lacked a valid warrant to install the device,9" or from
the fact that police officers with probable cause to monitor an
airplane's movements did not obtain valid third party consent
to the ETD's installation," or from the fact that the same
officers could not warrantlessly install the ETD because a
parked airplane does not fall within the vehicle exception to the
warrant requirement.2 In the face of constitutionally adequate
ETD monitoring, defects in police procedure such as these
seem inconsequential. 3
" 389 U.S. at 353.
U In United States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Tex. 1978), the court thought
the fact that the government agents had to enter a locked door to implant the ETD
was determinative.
" United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111-12 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v.
Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1976) (Ross, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1046 (1977). But see United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864-65 (1975), aff'd
in part and modified in part en banc, 537 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1976).
0 See, e.g., United States v. Rowland, 448 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (lawful
search warrant was issued, although it made no mention of need for forced entry to
install ETD).
"1 People v. Smith, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1977).
12 Id.
,1 In Dalia v United States, 47 U.S.L.W. 4423 (1979), the Supreme Court applied
similar reasoning in the context of electronic eavesdropping. Government agents had
court authorization to eavesdrop on conversations in Dalia's office, but they had no
warrant to enter the office in order to install the listening device. In holding that the
eavesdropping warrant implicitly authorized entry to install the device, the Court
noted:
It would extend the warrant clause to the extreme to require that, whenever
it is reasonably likely that Fourth Amendment rights may be affected in
more than one way, the court must set forth precisely the procedures to be
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Of course, police behavior in installing an ETD which
shocks the judicial conscience94 should not be curable by subse-
quent constitutional monitoring. The limitation on "shocking"
police behavior must be retained and should be strengthened.
But without a "shocking" violation, the only constitutionally
significant event should be the use of the ETD to monitor a
person's movements.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of an ETD problem must begin with an under-
standing that evading the fourth amendment issue is rarely
possible. Valid third party consent, or the installation of the
ETD in contraband or its equivalent, should not destroy any
constitutionally protected reasonable expectations of privacy
with respect to the monitoring of the ETD.
A court should distinguish ETD installation from monitor-
ing, and recognize that monitoring is "the more judicially cog-
nizable event."9 In analyzing monitoring, a court should re-
quire either a warrant issued on probable cause or the existence
of probable cause and such exigent circumstances as will ex-
cuse the warrant requirement. A court should hold that the
only event to be accorded constitutional status is monitoring.
Even though one may have a reasonable expectation that an
ETD has not been installed on his person, on his vehicle, or in
a dwelling in which he is rightfully present, without unconsti-
tutional monitoring there should be nothing to exclude. This
analysis will best serve the goals for the fourth amendment
outlined by Justice Brandeis:
The makers of our Constitution. . . conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
followed by the executing officers .... [W]e would promote empty for-
malism were we to require magistrates to make explicit what unquestionably
is implicit in bugging authorization: that a covert entry. . . may be neces-
sary for installation of the surveillance equipment.
Id. at 4428. Of the four dissenters in Dalia, only two took issue with this portion of the
opinion of the court. Id. at 4429 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
, United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
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protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the gov-
ernment upon the privacy of the individual whatever the
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment,"
" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
I
